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Formal models of cultural evolution have illustrated circumstances under which 
behavioral traits that have no inherent advantage over others can undergo positive 
selection pressure. One situation in which this may occur is when the behavior 
functions as a social marker, and there is pressure to identify oneself as a member of a 
particular group. Our aim in the current study was to determine whether participants 
organized into subpopulations could effectively exploit variation in a completely 
novel behavior to advertise themselves as belonging to a particular subpopulation, 
such that discrimination between in-group and out-group members was possible and 
subpopulations exhibited increasing distinctiveness. Eighty participants took part, 
organized into four subpopulations, each comprised of five four-member generations. 
They each completed a tower-building task, used in previous experimental studies of 
cultural evolution. An incentive payment structure was imposed with the aim of 
motivating participants to advertise themselves as belonging to a particular 
subpopulation, and to distinguish in-group members from members of other 
subpopulations. The first generation were exposed to photographs of randomly-
assigned “seed” towers, and later generations were exposed to photographs of the 
towers built by the members of the previous generation of their own subpopulation. 
Participants were able to discriminate towers built by in-group members of the same 
generation, from towers built by out-group members. Over generations, tower designs 
evolved such that they were increasingly identifiable as belonging to a particular 
subpopulation. Arbitrary traits, which had no prior advantage, became associated with 
group membership, providing empirical support for theoretical models.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Individuals have a range of motivations for preferentially interacting with those that 
share similar social backgrounds to themselves. These include potential protection against 
socially mobile free riders (e.g. Enquist & Leimar, 1993), as well as an increased chance 
of smooth and mutually beneficial interactions due to shared social norms (e.g. 
McElreath et al., 2003). In humans, culturally transmitted behaviors can potentially 
provide reliable information about the social background of the individuals displaying 
them, and hence we should expect people to be relatively adept when it comes to 
exploiting regularities, similarities, and variation, in behavior for the purpose of making 
such distinctions (Roberts, 2008). The result of this can be a change in the selective 
environment favoring the cultural (and possibly also biological) evolution of traits that 
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were not previously advantageous (Efferson et al., 2008; Laland et al., 2000; Richerson & 
Boyd, 2005).  
 Previous research has identified language as particularly well suited for this 
purpose (e.g. Nettle & Dunbar, 1997; Roberts, 2008). In Nettle and Dunbar’s (1997) 
model, individuals can both give and receive, with benefits to receivers outweighing costs 
to givers in accordance with the classic prisoner’s dilemma. Although cheats (who 
receive but never give) can invade a population of cooperators (who both give and 
receive), introducing dialects can help to stabilize cooperation. In the model, dialect 
learning cooperators (“polyglots”) give only to those with a similar dialect to their own, 
and modify their dialect on receipt of a gift to match their benefactor. The dialects also 
have a mutation rate which prevents them from stabilizing completely within an 
exchange group. Dialect learning cheats (“mimics”) also copy dialects on receipt of a gift, 
but never reciprocate. However, since these mimics have more restricted learning 
opportunities (due to being unable to engage in repeat interactions with previously 
exploited individuals) they cannot keep up with dialect changes as effectively as the 
cooperative polyglots, and therefore receive fewer gifts. 
Roberts (2008; 2010) carried out experimental work inspired by Nettle and 
Dunbar’s (1997) simulations. In Roberts’ studies, participants were assigned a teammate 
and engaged in an exchange with the goal of maximizing the score of their team. 
Participants were thus be motivated to exchange as much as possible with teammates, 
whilst attempting to benefit from their interactions with competing team members 
without giving anything. Participants were required to communicate using an invented 
(and highly restricted) language provided by the experimenter, which ensured that they 
were given no indication of who they were interacting with at any given point, and also 
that their only means of signaling their identity to their teammate was through non-
standard use of the provided language. Over a series of rounds, distinctive dialects of the 
artificial language were developed such that teammates could effectively identify one 
another, and engage in preferential exchange together in order to increase their team’s 
score.  
The role of linguistic cues as potential social markers is therefore relatively 
uncontroversial, but in theory any marker that has the potential to become associated with 
group membership can be used for this purpose. Indeed, given the seemingly boundless 
range of human cultural behavior, it is highly likely that many observable traits are 
readily exploited (either explicitly or implicitly) as cues to social background, and hence 
also likely loyalties and social norms. McElreath et al. (2003) describe a model designed 
to investigate the capacity for two alternative markers to become associated with norms 
of interaction, such that they might be used to predict the outcome of a coordination game 
in which payoffs were highest for pairs of players that selected the same behavior. In 
their model there were only two possible markers, representing a much simpler and 
potentially more general example of behavioral variation, compared with Nettle and 
Dunbar’s (1997) model of malleable and mutating dialects. In McElreath et al.’s model, 
mixing between populations (which may have settled on different coordination optima) 
can generate covariation between markers and behavior, potentially providing a useful 
cue to likely coordination or miscoordination. In their simulations they found that such 
associations between marker and behavior thus tended to increase over time due to the 
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higher payoffs earned by individuals with the most common combinations of marker and 
behavior, and selective copying of successful individuals.  
Efferson et al. (2008) followed up this model with an experimental study in the 
laboratory. Two subpopulations of participants were formed, with each placed in separate 
virtual environments, which had differing optimal coordination strategies. Within these 
subpopulations, participants learned to coordinate on the more beneficial behavior for 
their environment. However, participants were periodically swapped between 
subpopulations, resulting in their expectations about behavior conflicting with the local 
norms. Participants were also required to display one of two alternative (completely 
arbitrary) markers, and could decide whether or not to preferentially interact with those 
displaying the same marker as themselves. Although markers were initially randomly 
selected, and payoff-irrelevant, covariation between markers and behaviors accumulated 
over the course of the game such that it eventually became a very reliable predictor of 
behavior, and participants thus were inclined to choose to interact with those displaying 
the same marker.  
Our aim in the current study was to use a novel non-linguistic task with an open-
ended continuum of possible solutions, in order to investigate whether this could be 
exploited as a social marker, and if so, whether such use would result in increasing 
distinctiveness of the marker between groups. The task used was the spaghetti tower 
building task used by Caldwell & Millen (2008a; 2010), which has previously been 
shown to generate spontaneous variation in solution types across laboratory 
subpopulations of participants, even when participants are given an objective goal 
(maximize height), rather than a social one, as their target. These previous studies 
(Caldwell & Millen, 2008; 2010) also indicate that solutions to the task show an 
accumulation of modifications over experimental generations of participants, 
characteristic of cultural evolution. The task is therefore well suited to potential 
exploitation as a marker of group membership, and also as a candidate for cultural 
divergence between groups as a result of selection for (and possible exaggeration of) 
arbitrary traits. 
In the current study therefore we wished to create a situation in which participants 
would be motivated to show favoritism to in-group members (of experimentally-
generated subpopulations). The benefits of in-group favoritism should generate a 
motivation to attempt to advertise group membership through one’s own tower design, as 
well as a motivation to discriminate towers built by those with a similar social 
background to oneself (i.e. those with shared experience of exposure to the same set of 
previous designs in this case), compared with those from a different social background 
(exposed to a different set of towers).  
Our design therefore has much in common with classic studies of intergroup 
processes from the social psychology literature, which have experimentally created 
temporary, and anonymous, social groupings based on arbitrary distinctions (Tajfel’s 
famous “minimal group” paradigm, e.g. Tajfel, 1970). Studies carried out by Tajfel and 
others (see Brewer, 1979, for a review) indicate that participants categorized in this way 
show reliable tendencies to favor the in-group and discriminate against the out-group. 
Therefore, our intention is not to test such effects, but to pose the question of the likely 
population-level effects of such in-group favoritism over multiple learner generations. 
Mesoudi (2009) has drawn attention to the ways in which the two research fields of 
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cultural evolution and social psychology can inform one another, and notes that while 
social psychology provides insights into cultural micro-evolutionary processes, cultural 
evolution contributes population thinking, linking these small-scale processes to macro-
evolutionary patterns of variation in time and space. Mesoudi (2009) also notes that 
multi-generational experimental designs (to date relatively underused within the field of 
social psychology) present a valid method by which the population-level effects of 
individual social psychological processes can be investigated.  
Therefore, unlike the previous experimental studies of divergence in group markers 
by Roberts (2008; 2010) and Efferson et al. (2008), our groups consisted of multiple 
(experimental) generations of participants. Such designs have been variously referred to 
in the literature as either “microcultures” (Gerard et al., 1956), or “microsocieties” (Baum 
et al., 2004; Caldwell & Millen, 2008b). In such studies, participants typically complete 
the same task in succession, with the opportunity to either interact with, or observe the 
solutions of, their immediate predecessors (i.e. the previous experimental generation). We 
were therefore looking for increasing distinctiveness in behavior over generations, rather 
than over successive interactions between the same individuals as in the previous 
experimental work. Thus, if increasing distinctiveness was observed in our experiment, it 
would be attributable to an emergent outcome of individual copying decisions, making it 
more analogous to real world cultural evolution. 
We expected that participants would be able to effectively signal group 
membership using their own tower design, following exposure to the previous 
generation’s towers, and that participants would therefore perform above chance when 
attempting to distinguish towers built by fellow in-group members (exposed to the same 
previous generation towers as themselves) from those built by out-group members 
(exposed to a different set of previous generation towers). It was also predicted that, over 
generations, group-specific designs would develop such that towers built by members of 
the same generation of the same subpopulation would be significantly more similar to 
each other than they were to the towers built by members of the same generation of the 
other subpopulations.  
 
 
2. Method 
 
2.1 Participants 
Eighty participants were recruited from the University of Stirling and the University 
of Edinburgh. All participants took part in both sessions. Forty-six participants were 
females. The majority of participants (54) were in the age range 18-24. Nineteen were 
aged 25-34, and seven were aged 35-44. Participant rewards were paid in cash. 
Participants who were Psychology students at the University of Stirling could exchange 
£2.50 of their reward (or if the reward obtained was less, the entire reward) for 1 
experimental participation credit (one quarter of their full requirement for the semester). 
The rest of the reward was paid in cash. Ethical approval for the study was granted by the 
University of Stirling Psychology Ethics Committee. All participants gave written 
consent prior to taking part in the experiment. 
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Participants were assigned to a “subpopulation” and “generation” (see Fig. 1). 
There were five generations of participants, and four subpopulations. Within each 
subpopulation, there were four members within a generation.  
 
 
Figure 1. The structure of the laboratory population. Each circle represents a participant. 
Participants were organized into four subpopulations, comprised of five generations. In 
session 1 (Assimiliation Phase) participants were shown the four towers built by 
members of the previous generation of their subpopulation. In session 2 (Discrimination 
Phase) they were shown the three towers built by the three members of the same 
generation of their own subpopulation, plus one tower built by a member of the same 
generation of one of the other subpopulations. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Stimuli: Seed Towers 
The experimenters built the seed spaghetti towers which were shown to participants 
in the first generation. The seed towers were each built to one of four different pre-
specified designs, and four towers were built of each type, so that there were 16 towers in 
total. The 16 towers were then randomly distributed across subpopulations, with four 
seed towers for each subpopulation.  
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2.3 Presentation of Stimuli 
A script which selected the towers that each participant would see in each session of 
the experiment was written by author GR in Python 2.7. The scripts that stored the data 
and collected the token allocations were also written in Python 2.7. The user interfaces 
were created using the Tkinter module. 
 
2.4 Incentive Payment Structure 
The incentive payment structure was devised primarily to motivate participants to 
discriminate between the towers built by their in-group members (who had seen the same 
set of previous towers as themselves), from those built by out-group members 
(participants that had seen a different set of towers). It was also designed to motivate 
participants to build their own towers such that their fellow in-group members would be 
able to identify them in exactly this way. Payments were determined by the outcome of a 
follow-up session (the “Discrimination Phase”, see section 2.5) which occurred after 
participants had seen the previous generation’s towers and built their own (during the 
“Assimilation Phase”). In the follow-up session, participants were shown photographs of 
the towers built by the three members of the same generation of their own subpopulation, 
plus one photograph of a tower built by a member of the same generation from a different 
subpopulation (all previously unseen by this participant). Participants were asked to 
allocate nine tokens (each worth 50 pence) to these towers in any distribution they 
wanted, on the understanding that if they allocated a token to a in-group member both the 
participant and the recipient would get a “share” of 25 pence each. Alternatively, if they 
allocated any tokens to the out-group member this resulted in a direct transfer of the 50 
pence to that recipient. The payment structure was devised in this way in order to 
simulate a situation in which favors towards members of one’s own community were 
likely to be reciprocated during future encounters (hence the payment share), whereas 
members of different communities who were simply passing through would be likely to 
move on before favors were repaid (hence the direct transfer of the full value). Although 
participants could earn the full value of tokens through being mistaken for an in-group 
member by an out-group member, each participant only had the opportunity to earn 
tokens this way from one participant, whereas their tower photograph was shown to three 
in-group members. Again, this was intended to simulate a situation in which one was 
more likely to encounter members of one’s own community, and only more rarely 
venture into other communities. 
Therefore (in addition to a £1 base fee), all participants had the potential to earn up 
to £2.25 through their own choices (by allocating their tokens only to in-group members), 
and up to £6.75 through the choices of their fellow in-group members (through being 
allocated the maximum number of tokens by all three of these participants), and up to 
£4.50 through the choice of an out-group member (should they be allocated the maximum 
number of tokens by this participant). The minimum and maximum theoretically possible 
earnings were £1 and £14.50 respectively. In the actual experiment, the smallest reward 
received was £2.75 and the largest was £10.25. The mean reward was £5.50.  
 
2.5 Procedure 
All participants took part in two sessions. In the first session (here termed the 
“Assimilation Phase”), they were presented with photographs of four spaghetti towers 
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and asked to build one themselves. It was explained to participants that the towers in the 
photographs were those built by the four participants in the preceding generation of their 
own team (i.e. subpopulation). Under each photograph was stated the total number of 
tokens that the tower had been allocated. The first generation saw seed towers that were 
built by the experimenters. As these towers had not been rated, no information about 
tokens was shown. The token allocations, which would take place in the second session, 
and the reward system, were explained to them. It was explained to participants that in 
the follow-up session they could maximize their earnings by selecting towers built by 
members of their own team, who had been shown the same towers as themselves, from 
the previous generation. Participants were encouraged to build a tower that their fellow 
participants would be able to identify as belonging to their own team. The only means by 
which participants might identify each other as fellow teammates was through their 
choice of design in the spaghetti tower building task. Participants were asked to read the 
information sheet and the experimenters ensured that participants understood all parts of 
the experiment – particularly the payment structure, due to its complicated nature - before 
proceeding. Participants were each provided with one 500g packet of raw spaghetti, plus 
around 200g of red Newplast™  modeling material for the purpose of building their own 
tower. They were given ten minutes in which to inspect the previous generation towers 
and build their own. Examples of the towers produced by the participants of one 
subpopulation are shown in Figure 2, and all towers produced as part of the experiment 
are provided as supplementary online material (see Fig. S1, available on the journal’s 
website at www.ehbonline.org).  
Participants returned for a second session (here termed the “Discrimination Phase”), 
typically between one and two weeks after they completed the Assimilation Phase. At the 
start of the session, each participant was given a brief reminder of the payment structure 
and the previous generation towers which they had seen during the Assimilation Phase. 
Participants were then shown a different set of four photographs of towers. Three of these 
towers had been built by the participant’s in-group members of the same generation and 
one had been built by a participant from a different subpopulation from the same 
generation. Participants were asked to allocate their nine tokens (see section 2.4 above) to 
these towers in any distribution they wanted. Tokens were allocated by the participant 
entering a numeral in a box positioned below the photograph of the tower (a box could be 
left blank if no tokens were to be allocated, or a zero could be entered). When they had 
allocated all nine tokens and made their final decision, they clicked ‘OK’ and the 
information was stored. The program would not store the data if the total number of 
tokens was not equal to nine, and in this case the participant would be warned by a 
message appearing on screen stating, for example, “You still have 3 tokens to give 
away!”. If the tokens allocated did add up to nine, the message would simply say, 
“Thanks!”. Once all the participants in a generation had taken part in both sessions of the 
experiment, the rewards were calculated and awarded.  
 
 
 
 Matthews, C., Roberts, G., & Caldwell, C. A. (2012). Opportunity to assimilate and pressure to discriminate can generate cultural 
divergence in the laboratory. Evolution and Human Behavior, 33, 759-770. 
Figure 2. Tower designs from one complete subpopulation (of a total of four).  
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In both sessions, the four photographs were presented in a random order. All 
randomizations were done by computer using Python 2.7 scripts. The particular out-group 
tower that a participant saw in the second session was selected at random, such that one 
randomly chosen member of subpopulation 1 would see a randomly chosen tower from 
subpopulation 2, another member of the same group would see a tower from 
subpopulation 3, and another would see a tower from subpopulation 4. The remaining 
member would see a tower chosen at random from subpopulation 2, 3, or 4. Any given 
tower was shown to only one out-group member. Since every tower was also shown to 
the other three members of the same subpopulation, every tower would be seen (and 
could potentially be awarded tokens) four times: three times by in-group members and 
once by an out-group member. 
 
2.6 Similarity Ratings: Method 
When data collection was complete, all resulting tower photographs (including seed 
towers, so 96 photographs in total) were collated, and two raters, blind to the 
subpopulation membership of the towers, coded the similarity of the tower designs. 
Raters were asked to judge how similar pairs of towers were to each other, using seven 
point Likert-type rating scale, where 1 meant not at all similar and 7 meant very similar. 
Each tower was rated for its similarity to every other tower from the same generation, and 
every other tower from the previous and subsequent generations. So, each tower in 
generation 1 was compared to all other towers in generation 1, as well as all towers in 
generation 0, i.e. the seed towers, as well as all of those from generation 2.  
A new script was written in order to obtain the similarity ratings, again in Python 
2.7 and using the Tkinter module. The interface presented pairs of spaghetti towers. 
Under the photographs were seven buttons with the numerals from 1 to 7. Pairs of towers 
were presented in a random order, and it was also randomly determined which tower of 
each pair appeared on the left and which on the right. Every given pair was rated twice, 
and when the same pair was shown for the second time, the left/right presentation of that 
particular pair was reversed. Raters were simply required to click one of the buttons, at 
which point the rating was stored, and a new pair of towers was presented. There was 
also a button allowing the rater to go back to the previous pairing if a mistake was made. 
The rater could also quit at any time and resume the task from the point at which it had 
been left. Since each pair of towers was compared twice by each rater, it was possible to 
calculate intra-rater reliability by correlating the resulting pairs of similarity ratings 
comparing the same two towers, as well as inter-rater reliability by correlating the mean 
similarity scores given to each pair by the two raters. Intra-rater reliability was high 
(Rater 1 Spearman’s Rho: r = 0.857, N = 2000, p < 0.0005; Rater 2 Spearman’s Rho: r = 
0.864, N = 2000, p < 0.0005). Inter-rater reliability was lower, but ratings were 
nonetheless still highly significantly correlated (Spearman’s Rho: r = 0.653, N = 2000, p 
< 0.0005). The mean of the two raters’ similarity ratings for any given pair of towers was 
used in the subsequent analyses.  
 
2.7 Analysis 
Analyses were carried out using both the token allocations data, and the similarity 
ratings data. Both datasets were non-normally distributed, so nonparametric statistical 
tests were applied where possible. 
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3. Results 
 
3.1 Success in Identifying Group Members: Token Allocations 
Participants were required to divide their nine tokens between the four tower 
photographs they were shown during session 2, three of which were built by their in-
group members of the same generation, and one of which was built by a member of a 
another subpopulation. A chance level allocation to another individual was therefore 9/4 
(2.25 tokens). Data from participants’ token allocations showed that they were able to 
identify in-group members. Across all participants, the mean allocation made to each 
individual in-group member was 2.58 tokens (SD = 0.60), and the mean allocation to out-
group members was 1.25 tokens (SD = 1.79). A Wilcoxon test showed that participants 
were allocating significantly more of their tokens to individual in-group members, 
compared with out-group members: Z = 5.372, N = 80, p < 0.0005. 
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for token allocations over generations. The 
maximum possible average allocation to any individual in-group member was 3 tokens 
(i.e. if all nine tokens were allocated to in-group members and none to the out-group 
member). Participants were therefore performing close to ceiling level across all 
generations. The allocations of each generation were analyzed individually, and all but 
the very first generation were allocating significantly more tokens to in-group members, 
compared with out-group members. For generation 1, Z = 1.560, N = 16, p = 0.119; for 
generation 2, Z = 2.801, N = 16, p = 0.005; for generation 3, Z = 3.318, N = 16, p = 0.001; 
for generation 4, Z = 2.419, N = 16, p = 0.016; and for generation 5, Z = 2.102, N = 16, p 
= 0.036. 
 
 
Table 1. Mean allocation of tokens to individual in-group and out-group members, 
during session 2 (Discrimination Phase) of the experiment, over generations 1-5. 
Standard deviations are given in parentheses. A flat distribution of tokens to participants 
would generate an average of  2.25 tokens, and the maximum possible average in-group 
allocation was 3 tokens (9 tokens all allocated to the three in-group members, and none to 
the out-group member). 
 
Average 
allocation to 
individual 
in-group 
members 
Gen 1 Gen 2 Gen 3 Gen 4 Gen 5 All Gens 
2.35 2.67 2.79 2.63 2.48 2.58 
(0.74) (0.42) (0.38) (0.51) (0.79) (0.60) 
Average 
allocation to 
out-group 
member 
1.94 1.00 0.63 1.13 1.56 1.25 
(2.21) (1.26) (1.15) (1.54) (2.37) (1.79) 
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3.2 Success in Being Selected: Tokens Received 
Due to the payment structure, the mean number of tokens earned by participants 
was exactly nine. However, there was considerable variability in the number of tokens 
received by individual participants (min = 0, max = 21, SD = 4.99). The mean number of 
tokens earned by individual participants as a result of the total allocations by their three 
in-group members was 7.75 (min = 0, max = 19, SD = 0.50), whereas the mean number 
earned as a result of the allocation of the out-group member was 1.25 (min = 0, max = 9, 
SD = 1.79). Consequently, although tokens awarded by out-group members were worth 
twice as much to a recipient (due to the share-or-seize payment structure) participants 
nonetheless earned considerably more as a result of allocations split with in-group 
members (mean = £1.94), compared with those seized from out-group members (mean = 
£0.63).  
 
3.3 Similarity Ratings: Results 
Using the similarity ratings (see section 2.6) scores could be calculated for each 
participant for how similar her tower was to other towers from: a) the same generation of 
their own subpopulation; b) the previous generation of their own subpopulation; c) the 
same generation of the other subpopulations; and d) the previous generation of the other 
subpopulations. Descriptive statistics for these scores are displayed in Table 2. These 
scores could be used to determine the predictors of participants’ success in being selected 
during the Discrimination Phase. Table 3 displays the matrix of correlations (Spearman’s 
Rho due to the non-normal distributions involved) for the similarity rating scores, and the 
allocations received from in-group members and out-group members. As one might 
expect, the best predictor of allocations from in-group members, and total earnings, 
appeared to be the similarity between the tower in question and the towers from the 
previous generation of the same subpopulation (i.e. those towers that both recipient and 
in-group donors had had the opportunity to view during session 1, the Assimilation 
Phase). 
Although all similarity scores (whether measuring the similarity to towers from the 
same or previous generations, from the same or different subpopulations) appeared 
somewhat related to earnings, it should be noted that the similarity scores themselves 
were all highly intercorrelated (Table 3). Despite the non-normal distribution of the 
dataset partial correlations were also carried out, in order to determine whether any of the 
similarity measures (other than similarity to towers from the previous generation of the 
same subpopulation) independently predicted total earnings. These reinforced the picture 
presented by the alpha-corrected correlation matrix in Table 3. When holding constant the 
similarity to towers from the previous generation of the same subpopulation, similarity to 
the previous generation of the other subpopulations remained significant (r = 0.300, df = 
77, p = 0.007) but the other relationships did not (for similarity to the same generation of 
other subpopulations, r = 0.177, df = 77, p = 0.119; and for similarity to the same 
generation of the same subpopulation, r = -0.014, df = 77, p = 0.903). Figure 3 displays 
the mean similarity scores for participants according to brackets of earnings from the 
allocations of other participants.  
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Table 2. Mean similarity ratings for towers, when compared to towers of the same and 
previous generations, from the same or different subpopulations, over generations 0-5. 
Standard deviations given in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Gen 0 
(seeds) 
Gen 1 Gen 2 Gen 3 Gen 4 Gen 5 
In-Group 
Same Generation 
3.39 2.91 2.98 3.43 3.13 3.56 
(1.89) (1.73) (1.43) (1.76) (1.52) (1.38) 
In-Group 
Previous Generation 
(viewed during session1: 
Assimilation Phase) 
--- 3.29 3.44 3.60 3.51 3.51 
--- (1.92) (1.95) (1.98) (1.80) (1.51) 
Out-Group 
Same Generation 
3.71 2.73 2.53 2.58 2.76 2.80 
(1.90 (1.45) (1.28) (1.45) (1.41) (1.23) 
Out-Group 
Previous Generation 
--- 2.97 2.59 2.52 2.67 2.74 
--- (1.64) (1.34) (1.32) (1.45) (1.33) 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Total earnings from other participants’ allocations in relation to the tower’s 
similarity to others from the same and previous generations, from their own and other 
subpopulations (mean +/- SD). 
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Table 3. Correlation matrix (Spearman’s Rho) for measures of similarity and earnings 
from allocations from in-group members (IGMs), out-group members (OGMs), as well as 
total earnings from allocations (N = 80 for all). Results in bold remained significant 
following correction for multiple comparisons by using an adjusted alpha level of p = 
0.0024. 
 
  Earnings Similarity Ratings 
  
from 
IGMs 
from 
OGMs 
Total 
In-
Group 
Same 
Gen 
In-
Group 
Prev 
Gen 
Out-
Group 
Same 
Gen 
Earnings 
from 
OGMs 
r=.120  
    
p=.288      
Total 
r=.860 r=.582 
    
p<.001 p<.001     
Similarity 
Ratings 
In-Group 
Same Gen 
r=.265 r=.219 r=.322  
  
p=.018 p=.051 p=.004    
In-Group 
Prev Gen 
r=.608 r=.167 r=.578 r=.587   
p<.001 p=.139 p<.001 p<.001   
Out-
Group 
Same Gen 
r=.250 r=.193 r=.312 r=.338 r=.245  
p=.025 p=.086 p=.005 p=.002 p=.029  
Out-
Group 
Prev Gen 
r=.349 r=.336 r=.461 r=.399 r=.448 r=.722 
p=.001 p=.002 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 
 
 
3.4 Cultural Divergence 
We expected that, over generations, participants’ towers would become increasingly 
easy to identify as belonging to a particular subpopulation, as groups developed 
distinguishing features. We therefore predicted that the similarity ratings comparing pairs 
of towers from the same generation of the same subpopulation would increase over 
generations, and that an objective measure of identifiability, calculated from the within-
group and across-group similarities for each tower (as in previous studies, e.g. Caldwell 
& Millen, 2010) would also increase over generations.  
The mean similarity rating for all towers built by participants, when compared with 
towers from the same generation of their own subpopulation, was 3.20 (SD = 1.07), 
whereas the mean similarity rating when being compared with towers from the same 
generation of other subpopulations was 2.68 (SD = 0.63). The within-group similarity 
ratings were significantly higher than the across-group similarity ratings (Wilcoxon test: 
Z = 3.940, N = 80, p < 0.0005).  
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We calculated the identifiability of towers as in Caldwell & Millen (2010). 
Similarity ratings were given on a scale of 1-7 (as detailed in section 2.6) so these were 
first transformed by subtracting 1 from each to give a scale of 0-6. This scale was then 
used to calculate each tower’s similarity to others from the same subpopulation in relation 
to its similarity to towers from other subpopulations. A proportion [within-group 
similarity / (within-group similarity + across-group similarity)] was calculated, such that 
the range of possible values ran from 0 to 1, with values greater than 0.5 indicating higher 
within-group similarity ratings, and values less than 0.5 indicating higher across-group 
similarity ratings. This score was calculated for each individual tower, the resulting value 
providing an indication of the likelihood of identifying that particular tower as coming 
from that particular chain. Figure 4 displays descriptive statistics for this measure of 
identifiability across all generations, including the seed towers. It should be noted that the 
seed towers, which were randomly assigned to generation 0 of each chain, were in fact 
rather more dissimilar to others from the same subpopulation than would be expected by 
chance (also apparent from the separate within-group and across-group mean similarity 
ratings as displayed in Table 2). However, consistent with the direct comparisons 
between within- and across-group similarity, the measures of identifiability for all towers 
built by participants were significantly higher than an expected chance level of 0.5 (One-
sample Wilcoxon test: Z = 3.190, N = 80, p = 0.0005, one-tailed). 
 
 
Figure 4. Mean identifiability (+/- SD) of towers from their own generation set 
(calculated from same generation within-group and across-group similarity scores for 
each tower).  
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Each generation was also analyzed individually, including the seed generation, to 
determine whether that generation showed significant within-group similarity in relation 
to across-group similarity. Whether testing this by comparing within-group to across-
group similarity measures, or using the identifiability measure discussed above, made no 
difference to the significance of any of the tests. Consequently, only the results using the 
identifiability measure are reported here. For the seed towers, there was a trend towards 
the towers being somewhat less identifiable than would be expected by chance (One-
sample Wilcoxon test: Z = -1.655, N = 16, p = 0.098, two-tailed). For towers built by 
participants however, all generations showed above chance-level identifiability, although 
this was not significant for every generation. For generations 1, 2 and 4, identifiability 
was not significantly higher than would be expected by chance (Generation 1: Z = 0.724, 
N = 16, p = 0.235; Generation 2: Z = 0.621, N = 16, p = 0.268; Generation 4: Z = 1.448, 
N = 16, p = 0.074, all one-tailed). However, for Generation 3 and Generation 5, 
identifiability was significantly higher than would be expected by chance (Generation 3: 
Z = 1.965, N = 16, p = 0.025; Generation 5: Z = 2.379, N = 16, p = 0.009, both one-
tailed). The result for Generation 5 also remains significant following Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons, using an adjusted alpha level of 0.01 (0.05/5), 
although the Generation 3 result does not, so the Generation 3 result should be interpreted 
more cautiously.  
We also used Page’s L Trend Test, a nonparametric repeated-measures analysis 
predicting a monotonic relationship amongst treatment groups (Page, 1963), in line with 
our predictions of increasing identifiability and within-chain similarity over generations. 
For the current study, reducing the data to subpopulation-level averages produced a 
dataset consisting of only four replicates, giving limited statistical power, but doing so 
permitted repeated-measures analyses over generations in line with the predictions. 
Using the subpopulation averages for identifiability, there was a significant 
tendency for increasing identifiability over generations, when including the seed 
generation towers (L = 330, m = 4, n = 6, p = 0.010), and this approached significance 
when excluding the seed generation (L = 195, m = 4, n = 5, p = 0.066). Within-chain 
similarity also showed an increase over generations. For this measure, this was not 
significant when including the seed generation, due to the high degree of similarity 
between all towers in this generation, including those from different subpopulations (see 
Table 2 for the relevant similarity measures): L = 305, m = 4, n = 6, p = 0.241. This was 
due to the way in which the towers for the seed generation were created (as detailed in 
section 2.2). However this was significant when considering only the towers built by 
participants: L = 197, m = 4, n = 5, p = 0.045). 
 
 
4. Discussion 
 
Consistent with our predictions, participants were able to build towers that could 
function as social markers, in terms of revealing which set of previous towers they had 
been exposed to. Also in line with predictions, this allowed participants to perform above 
chance when it came to picking out towers built by in-group members (who were 
exposed to the same set of previous towers as themselves) from those of out-group 
members (who saw a different set). The final predication was that, over generations, the 
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designs used by the different subpopulations would differentiate (from a starting point of 
completely random variation between subpopulations), and this was also supported. 
It is worth drawing particular attention to the fact that the measures used to 
determine increasing within-group similarity and distinctiveness over generations used 
the similarity ratings between pairs of towers from the same generation. Thus, the greater 
similarity to towers from the same subpopulation was not a consequence of direct 
exposure, since these participants did not see each other’s towers until after they had built 
their own. Any within-group similarity between same generation towers arose as a 
consequence of the participants making similar decisions about what to copy from the 
previous generation’s towers. Even early generation participants were able to build 
towers that were similar to those from the previous generation (to which they were 
exposed) such that their ingroup members could identify them (doing so at above chance 
levels from generation 2 onwards). It can also be seen that similarity to towers from the 
previous generation remained relatively stable over generations (Table 2). However, 
evidence of significant above-chance identifiability first emerged in generation 3, with a 
relatively robust above-chance effect arising in generation 5. Presumably in earlier 
generations participants were able to recognize some similarity between an in-group 
member’s tower and the set of previous tower designs to which both had been exposed, 
without these participants necessarily building towers that were similar to each other’s. It 
was only in later generations when the cumulative effect of similar copying decisions 
generated significant within-generation within-group similarity.  
The within-generation similarity therefore appears to arise as an emergent 
consequence of the participants’ attempts to model their designs on the previous 
generation. This occurred without any explicit attempt at coordination between in-group 
members, nor any opportunities for communication since participants never met one 
another. Nonetheless, there were good theoretical reasons for predicting this outcome, as 
it was expected that participants would exhibit similar biases in their copying of previous 
generation towers, and that this would generate the predicted differentiation between 
groups. Mathematical models of gene-culture coevolution (e.g. Boyd & Richerson, 1985) 
have illustrated that certain biases in social learning are highly adaptive, including 
positive frequency-dependent social learning, and model-based biases, both of which are 
relevant here. In positive frequency-dependent social learning (or conformity) the learner 
shows a disproportionate tendency to copy majority variants, and such a bias is capable of 
supporting within-group homogeneity and between-group variation (Efferson, Lalive, 
Richerson, McElreath & Lubell, 2008). If our participants were copying features of the 
previous generation towers which appeared to be most common, then over the 
generations this would result in greater homogeneity within the subpopulations. 
Model-based biases could have a similar effect. Amongst potential model-based 
biases, particular attention has been given to the idea that learners might preferentially 
attend to, and learn from, successful individuals (e.g. Henrich & Gil-White 2001; Henrich 
& McElreath, 2007). Social learners who are selective in this way will tend to have an 
advantage over those who are less selective, as they have a greater chance of adopting 
behaviors associated with success. Since we provided participants with information about 
the tokens earned by each member of the previous generation, this made it possible to use 
a success-bias copying strategy, based on highest earnings. Again, this would be liable to 
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generate greater similarity within subpopulations, assuming participants were using 
similar copying biases.  
The details of our payment and population structure must of course be taken into 
consideration in interpreting the results, as it may well be the case that the outcome 
would be rather different should some of these details be altered. As noted in the 
methods, we made the decision that in session 2, the Discrimination Phase, participants 
would be asked to allocate their tokens between four towers, three of which were built by 
members of the same generation of their own subpopulation, and one of which was built 
by a member of one of the other subpopulations. This meant that to maximize earnings it 
was a good strategy to try to be identifiable as an in-group member by those from one’s 
own subpopulation, even taking the share-or-seize payment structure into consideration. 
However, the average allocation per individual in-group member was 2.58 tokens (£0.65 
when shared) and the average allocation per out-group member was 1.25 tokens (£0.63 
seized), and therefore the actual earnings per individual encounter was roughly 
equivalent (see Table 1). As a consequence, had our game structure been different, with 
participants asked to choose between an equal number of in-group and out-group 
members, there might have been no particular advantage to those that were very similar 
to others from their own specific subpopulation compared with the others. All the same, 
in the absence of equivalent exposure to markers from any other subpopulation, explicitly 
attempting to pass oneself off as an out-group member does not seem viable as a strategy 
within our game structure, whereas trying hard to make oneself highly identifiable to the 
in-group would remain an option by which one could attempt to maximize earnings.  
Interestingly, this point is related to another feature of our game structure, which, 
given the results, may provide an illuminating insight into the evolution of real world 
group markers. Since participants were required to allocate their tokens between a set of 
towers which included more than one (three, in this case) built by in-group members, this 
meant that for any given allocation there was not just competition between in-group and 
out-group members for the tokens, but also competition between in-group members. For 
the participant making the allocations, it was in their interests to allocate tokens in line 
with their confidence that a particular tower was built by a member of their own 
subpopulation. Furthermore, the zero-sum nature of our payment structure (since shared 
payments were exactly halved) meant that the development of group markers could not 
increase average earnings over generations since these were constant. This means that 
competition to be the most identifiable within one’s own generation of a subpopulation is 
likely to be at least partly responsible for the divergence observed in our experiment. It is 
quite likely that such effects would extend to real world situations in which cultural 
evolution operates on group markers. When the behavior that functions as a marker 
shows continuous variation and has almost limitless possibilities for innovation, as in our 
experiment, then there is likely to be competition not just between those exhibiting the 
marker or not, but also between those who exhibit the marker to differing degrees. It is 
possible that this could lead to the increasing exaggeration of particular group-typical 
characteristics. Interestingly, such competition is also likely to prevent markers from 
becoming completely stabilized, maintaining the need for learning through exposure to 
recent exemplars (c.f. Nettle & Dunbar, 1997, who explicitly incorporate a mutation rate 
in their model of dialects in order to prevent stabilization). 
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It should also be noted that, within our game structure, during the Assimilation 
Phase participants were only exposed to towers from their own subpopulation. The study 
was intentionally designed in this way in order to reflect a situation in which naïve 
members of a community have the opportunity to learn from more experienced members 
of that particular community, and do not have the opportunity to learn from members of 
other communities. This meant that, although participants could copy towers from the 
previous generation in such a way that might allow theirs to be identified as similar to 
those ones (perhaps by copying features which were most common in the set of previous 
generation towers, or by copying a particular tower design which they assumed to be 
quite distinctive), they could not actively attempt to produce something that was 
dissimilar to the out-group. We would expect that (assuming it was still most beneficial 
to be highly identifiable as an in-group member) exposure to out-group towers in the 
Assimilation Phase would actually increase the divergence observed, and/or cause it to 
happen more rapidly.  
The payment structure itself could of course be responsible for the outcome. We 
used direct financial incentives to motivate participants to advertise their group 
membership, and to discriminate the in-group from the out-group. As we detailed in the 
introduction, we were taking these factors as basic assumptions about human intergroup 
psychology, and therefore wanted to ensure that our participants did indeed behave in this 
way within our laboratory situation, allowing us to study the population-level 
consequences of such behavior. However, these human tendencies for identifying with 
and favoring the in-group are now extremely well understood, and they appear to be 
remarkably persistent. Studies in the laboratory show that groups formed on even the 
most trivial and irrelevant grounds nonetheless reliably exhibit these biases (Tajfel, 
1970). Our payment structure therefore may have been crucial to motivate our 
participants to behave in this way, but it is also entirely possible that they would have 
shown these same motivations and biases in the absence of the incentive payment 
structure.  
In addition, it must be taken into account that our task (in the context of this 
particular study) functioned only as a marker of group membership. In the real world, 
traits that can function as group markers often perform other functions which place 
constraints on their form. It remains to be seen how flexible group markers can be when 
there are competing functional pressures on the form of the behavior. 
Our task involved building a material artifact, whereas some social markers (e.g. 
linguistic cues like dialects, see introduction) involve behaviors that leave no physical 
trace. The consequence of this is that different social learning mechanisms may be 
implicated in the transmission of different types of social marker. Copying another’s 
behavior is generally referred to as imitation, with copying of products (e.g. material 
artifacts) defined as emulation (e.g. Whiten, 2011). Reproduction of linguistic cues 
therefore requires imitative learning, whereas copying from the photograph of a finished 
product (as in our task in the current study) depends solely on emulation. Caldwell, 
Schillinger, Evans and Hopper (2012) have discussed the imitation/emulation distinction 
in greater depth, with regard to the spaghetti tower building task. With this task, 
participants readily copy from finished products (including photographs of other towers, 
see Caldwell et al., 2012), and so the current design was adequate to capture these effects. 
However, to enable the transmission of some other types of social marker, direct 
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interaction with another individual may be necessary, and indeed such interaction might 
even enhance social learning in a task such as this one.   
With regard to the specific features which may have functioned as group markers in 
our subpopulations, it should be noted that there are certain limitations to what our 
similarity ratings data can reveal. We cannot tell from the ratings which features, if any, 
participants might have exploited in order to either discern or advertise group 
membership. All the same, we can see informal evidence of at least one particular, 
relatively distinctive, feature acting as a probable marker in the towers built by one of our 
four subpopulations (see Fig. 2). In this subpopulation subtle (and likely unintentional) 
features of early generation towers appear to have been deliberately exaggerated in later 
generations for the purpose of communicating group membership, resulting in a 
distinctive fan-like feature that appeared in the majority of towers from generation 3 
onwards. 
In conclusion, we found that, in an experimental laboratory situation, human 
participants could readily exploit variation in a novel behavior to both effectively 
assimilate themselves to a particular group, and to discriminate between others on the 
basis of their efforts to assimilate to a particular group. The outcome of this, over several 
experimental generations of participants, was that particular designs arbitrarily became 
associated with group membership. This provides a valuable insight into the likely 
population-level effects of well recognized psychological processes relating to intergroup 
behavior. On the basis of our findings, we conclude that many socially transmitted 
behaviors (assuming functionality places no major constraints on the form) can 
potentially reveal information about the social background of the actor and hence be 
exploited as a social marker.  
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